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Reviewed by Steven Z. Levine, Bryn Mawr College 
In his much-acclaimed first book, Techniques of the Observer: On Vision and Modernity in the 
Nineteenth Century (Cambridge, MA, and London: MIT Press, 1990), Jonathan Crary, Associate 
Professor of Art History at Columbia University, argues that in the course of the first half of the 
nineteenth century in Europe the prevailing philosophical model of human visual perception 
based on the optical mechanism of the camera obscura--an enclosed, darkened chamber outfitted 
with a lens to focus an instant image of the exterior world onto an interior screen--came to be 
replaced by a new physiological model of an embodied, light-sensitive eye subject to the 
changing pulsations of exterior as well as interior (or entoptical) retinal stimulation. From An 
Essay Concerning Human Understanding of 1690 by John Locke to Hermann von Helmholtz's 
Treatise on Physiological Optics of 1856-66 and Sigmund Freud's unpublished "Project for a 
Scientific Psychology" of 1895, we thus are led to traverse an epistemological terrain in 
tremendous upheaval in which the empiricist representation of a stable spatial dualism of subject 
and object is transformed into an unstable temporal scenario of subject and object in continuous 
physical and psychological interaction. It is the unfolding of this reciprocal scenario in the 
second half of the nineteenth century that provides the compelling narrative of Crary's new 
sequel, Suspensions of Perception: Attention, Spectacle, and Modern Culture. 
Crary takes his title in part from Freud's 1912 paper on psychoanalytic technique in which the 
analyst is advised to attend to the analysand with gleichschwebende Aufmerksamkeit or an 
"evenly suspended attention" (367). Such a modality of attention seeks to overcome the rigid 
dualism of an all-knowing physician and an unknowing patient in order to allow a novelty of 
knowledge to be produced through an unscripted and unpredictable interaction between the two. 
Rather than try to force a fragile human faculty of attentiveness into an impossibly unwavering 
fixity of focus, Freud instead authorizes the analyst to be open without prejudgment to the 
multisensorial flow of the temporal event. In contrast to this suspension of the analyst within the 
flow of time, Freud's philosophical predecessor Arthur Schopenhauer had earlier advocated "a 
purified perception that would be a suspension from time and the body's economy," and it is this 
poignant but unattainable emancipation from the inexorable march of time that Crary names the 
"mirage of modernism" that he seeks to demystify in his new book (57). "It is a dream that 
begins . . . with Schopenhauer--the dream of an attention absolved of the play of difference, of 
flux--of a perception that becomes a suspension of will [Schopenhauer's word for the ineluctable 
exigencies of Life], a submission to the frozen phantasmic logic of unification" (211). 
Unification, that shibboleth of modernism, is Crary's word for Death. 
Although Crary learnedly calls upon the post-Kantian philosophical quest for the suspended 
timelessness, indeed eternity, that would be the absolute transcendence of the empirical 
vicissitudes of the human body subjected to the inhuman determinations of space and time, the 
signature-novelty of his discourse is its reliance on the experimental literature of physiology and 
psychology to sustain his argument concerning the empirical basis of "a suspended temporality, a 
hovering out of time" (10). Hypnosis, a phenomenon of the greatest interest to late nineteenth-
century investigators such as Charcot, Freud, and William James, is thus presented as exemplary 
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in its intrinsic duality "involving an intensification of focal concentration with a relative 
suspension of peripheral awareness" (66). The result of hypnosis will be "a suspension of critical 
judgment," in the words of the Journal of Neuropsychiatry and Clinical Neuroscience of 1991 
which Crary characteristically cites (68), but Crary's aim is to argue that this same biological 
coimplication of opposed mental states historically characterizes the fluctuating attention and 
distraction of nineteenth-century life under capitalism just as it increasingly characterizes 
twenty-first century life in the face of the alternately enslaving and emancipating pixellations of 
our ubiquitous cybernetic screens. 
After a first chapter of some sixty pages in which Crary considers "Modernity and the Problem 
of Attention," he turns to three lengthy historical exemplifications of the nineteenth-century 
dialectic of a powerfully normative and focalized attention and an irresistibly countervailing and 
defocalized distraction in the art of Edouard Manet ("Unbinding Vision"), Georges Seurat 
("Illuminations of Disenchantment"), and Paul Cézanne ("Reinventing Synthesis"). Variously 
named the "irreducibly mixed modalities" of perception (3), "a deeply equivocal attentiveness 
and distraction" (103), "a ceaseless play of disclosure and concealment" (150), "an inseparable 
mix of an abstract mathematically constructed space and a [subjectively determined] 
physiological perception" (218), "the rhythmic coexistence of radically heterogeneous and 
temporally dispersed elements" (297), "the dynamic reciprocity of perceptual fixation and 
disintegration" (332), "a contradictory form of synthetic unity in which rupture is also part of an 
unbroken flow of time, in which disjunction and continuity must be thought together" (344-45), 
all of Crary's insistently dialectical locutions are so many rhetorical figures for "the inevitable 
intertwining of subject and object" (284). "Hovering between a functional operation of vision 
and the atemporal undulations of reverie" (88; Manet's The Balcony, 1868), hovering 
"enigmatically between the evocation, the promise of a chromatic immediacy and the relentless 
unmasking of the absence and vacancy of appearance within a reified, quantifiable world" (151; 
Seurat's Sideshow, 1887-88), "hovering at a threshold where revelation is inseparable from the 
onset of its dissolution" (359; Cézanne's Pines and Rocks, c. 1900), these and other paintings by 
the same artists are seen to hover "ambiguously between two scopic regimes . . . : between the 
metric and homogeneous tableau loosely synonymous with classical space, and a decentered and 
destabilized perceptual regime with its mobile and embodied observer" (190). And if paintings, 
not unlike the Holy Ghost, may be said to hover in the betweenness of the phenomenal and 
noumenal worlds of science and religion, so too the worshipper-beholder manqué of capitalist 
commodification, "hovering between submission to its empirical operation and anticipation of a 
luminous fusion of all that is unreconciled in it" (280).  
We can discern in his quasi-religious language that Crary's critique of capitalism and his hope for 
social transformation is sustained by the messianic modernist Marxisms of Walter Benjamin, 
Theodor Adorno, and their principal American explicator Fredric Jameson. According to 
Jameson's Frankfurt School negative dialectics, the modernist art that is Crary's concern is 
precisely defined in The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1981) as marking an "absence at the heart of the secular world . . . an 
object world forever suspended on the brink of meaning, forever disposed to receive the 
revelation of evil or grace that never comes" (151). As Crary concludes with perhaps a tad more 
optimism of faith, 
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In the works I've examined by Manet, Seurat, and Cézannne, a sustained attentiveness 
was never fully separate from a complex social and psychic machinery of sublimation; an 
absorbed perception, for each of them, was the disavowal, the evasion of a vision that laid 
bare an injured horizon of unfulfilled yearnings. Yet in its suspension, it also produced 
the conditions in which the apparent necessity and self-sufficiency of the present could be 
dissolved, allowing the anticipation of an ineffable future and also the redemption of the 
shimmering and derelict objects of memory. (362)  
Alternatively, "presentness is grace," and it is these final words from Michael Fried's notorious 
essay, "Art and Objecthood" of 1967 (reprinted in Art and Objecthood: Essays and Reviews 
[Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998]) that comprise the barely unacknowledged 
intertext for Crary's modernist critique. If not present explicitly in this quotation, Fried is 
otherwise far from absent in Crary's text. Of Manet's In the Conservatory(1879), Crary's 
principal exhibit for the painter's dialectical suspension of the absence and presence in 
representation, Crary notes that Fried in Manet's Modernism or, The Face of Painting in the 
1860s (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996) both affirms the almost excessive finish of 
the painting in many of its details even as he affirms at the same time the strikingly unfinished 
quality of other parts of the painting (90). Also borrowed from Fried is the cardinal notion of the 
dialectic of attention and distraction, but whereas Fried in Absorption and Theatricality: Painting 
and Beholder in the Age of Diderot (Berkeley: University of California, 1980) tends to see 
paintings by different artists as either productive of an intense or a merely casual mode of 
spectatorial attentiveness, Crary tends to position this contrast as an internal fluctuation within 
the paintings he examines by Manet, Seurat, and Cézanne. Thus for Crary, Fried's account of 
eighteenth-century art provides only one half of the phenomenological transaction of the new, 
modern spectator with the new, modernist work of art in France one hundred years later: "A 
painting, it was claimed, had first to attract (attirer, appeller) and then to arrest (arrêter) and 
finally to enthrall (attacher) the beholder . . . as if spellbound and unable to move" (241 n. 212). 
Adapted from a phrase in a letter of Freud describing his transient absorption in a communal 
experience of visual perception followed by his lonely alienation from the anonymous crowd at 
an outdoor cinematographic performance in 1907, "Spellbound in Rome" is the title of Crary's 
epilogue, and it is his means--or rather mine--of moving from the spellbound aesthetics of a 
Diderotian, Schopenhauerian, or Friedian modernism of a decorporealized and suspended 
presentness to a Nietzschean, Mallarméan, or Derridean modernism/postmodernism that would 
be, in the words of Leo Bersani in The Freudian Body: Psychoanalysis and Art (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1986), "a lesson in the nonpresentness constitutive of human 
attention and expression" (119 n. 82). It is, of course, a somatic embeddedness of thought and 
affect that will reintegrate the split Kantian dualism of mind and body in the new materialist 
dialectics of psychoanalysis. Already in 1850 Freud's experimental predecessor Helmholtz had 
insisted on the impossibility of an instantaneous presentness of visual perception on account of 
the deferred neurological time between stimulus and response (310). For Crary, Henri Bergson's 
modernist effort forty years later to reunify what had been rent asunder in the scientific 
laboratory was "an imaginary imposition of unity on contents that are irreducibly dissociated" 
(327). And thus for Crary it is the modernity of the achievement of Manet, Seurat, and Cézanne 
in the pictorial domain, as it is the modernity of the achievement of Freud in the indissoluble 
realm of the senses, to have designed "a singular model of attentiveness, one that resists the 
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notion of selection and surmounts an inhibition of the peripheral" (368). "It is a loss of self that 
shifts uncertainly between an emancipatory evaporation of interiority and distance and a 
numbing incorporation into myriad assemblages of work, communication, and consumption" 
(370).  
Neither "a seamless regime of separation" under market capitalism nor "an ominous collective 
mobilization" of the totalitarian state, the future utopia whose advent Crary proclaims "will be a 
patchwork of fluctuating effects in which individuals and groups continually reconstitute 
themselves" (370). This will be so, Crary believes, because "an embodied subject is both the 
location of operations of power and the potential for resistance" (3). Only if saying it would be 
enough to make it so. 
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